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ABSTRACT
This project examines the protection methods suggested by hackers to
guard against online victimization through the lens of Situation Crime Prevention.
Data were collected from 85 webpages representing three categories of
electronic communications: forums, blogs, and fan pages. The goal of this project
was to identify which of the 25 opportunity reduction techniques the hacking
community recommend most often, as well as, what level of expertise was
associated with the suggested security measures. Results indicate that the
technique most recommended by the hacking community was to remove targets
with 27% of the total codings. From the results three themes were found: (1)
most recommendations are such that implementing the strategies would serve to
protect against opportunistic, low-skilled attacks; (2) most recommendations
could be considered routine precautions, that when bundled, would secure most
people against cyber-theft; and finally, (3) the Situational Crime Prevention
framework was not fully realized because much of cyber-theft does not involve
direct victim-perpetrator interactions. From these three themes policy
recommendation and limitations are presented as well as avenues for future
research.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Hacking related data breeches have dominated the news in recent times.
For example, the Equifax hack is said to have leaked social security numbers
and other financial data from up to 143 million people in the United States (Alfred
and Musil, 2017); in 2015, the data breech of the credit reporting agency
Experian affected 15 million T-Mobile customers (Weise, 2015); and, Yahoo
reported that in their 2013 hack, all their user’s account information, 3 billion in
total, were stolen (CNN, 2017). These large-scale hacking cases have the
capacity to ruin millions of lives. What is worse is that the effects of these hacks
could go unnoticed for a considerable period of time and the effects can be long
term, i.e., a stolen social security number could be used to take out a loan, and it
could take years for a victim to reestablish their credit score following a default on
this fraudulent loan. Understanding how cybercriminals, specifically hackers,
defend themselves online is crucial to advancing effective protective measures
against identity theft; after all, hackers are the most knowledgeable about the
robustness of security measures.
This study applies the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) framework to
classify methods of protection recommended by hackers in electronic forums that
are popular within the hacker community. Tallying the number of times a
technique is suggested provides a rough gauge of the popularity of protective
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measures. This indirectly indicates the confidence placed on the measure by the
hacker community.
There is a vital need for this study because first, there is a call by
researchers to look at computer crime using criminology theories (Willison &
Siponen, 2009). Yet, there are few studies which examine this phenomenon
through the experiences of offenders. Second, in 2016 the Internet Crime
Complaint Center (ICCC) received 298,728 reports of cybercrime. The monetary
losses from hacking related cybercrimes were a combined total of over 526
million dollars. Most of these victims are over the age of 60: Victims over 60 had
a combined total loss of 336 million dollars. Computer crime is an extremely
costly problem affecting the most vulnerable populations.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of
cybercrime as well as its differences and similarities to street crime. Next, the
discussion examines the main theory behind the Situational Crime Prevention
(SCP) perspective, the Rational Choice Perspective, and the nine major
assumptions that it makes on criminal decisions. Next, I explain SCP and how
offenders use techniques to defend themselves from becoming victims. After
drawing attention to the decision-making process of cybercriminals, this chapter
concludes with an explanation of need to document the strategies that hackers
use to protect themselves from cybercrime. Specifically, I review why the gaps in
offenders as victims and cybercriminal research should be closed.
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Chapter 3 describes the methods. First, I describe the three different types
of web sources (forums, fan pages, and blogs) from which data were collected.
From these sources, the techniques the hacker community recommended are
applied to the opportunity reduction techniques of SCP. I also describe the
websites used in Appendix A. Next, is a discussion of how each of the
techniques were coded into NVivo; specifically, I report on how each technique
was classified as a node in NVivo’s qualitative coding. Finally, I conclude with the
general findings of how each of the general categories were represented within
the sources.
Chapter 4 contains the results of this study. First, I go over each technique
and its prevalence within the hacker community. Next, I give examples of coding
of each technique. Finally, in chapter 5 I go over three themes, Hacker
Opportunities, Routine Precautions, and The Difficulties in Applying Situational
Crime Prevention, that were found in the results. Within these themes policy
recommendations are given, as well as, the limitations of this research and areas
where future research could expand upon.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Cybercrime
Cybercrime is a destructive crime which has many ways it can be
committed (Dogaru, 2012). This section seeks first, to understand the definition
of cybercrime, and then, to explore its differences and similarities to street crime.
Next, this section examines the different typologies of cybercrime. Following that,
this paper goes on to examine hackers and why they are the focus of this
research project. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of the harm that
hackers present to society.
Definition
Cybercrime can be defined as any crime occurring on, or using a
computer (Dogaru, 2001; Doyle, 2014; D’Ovidio, 2007). Cybercrime
encompasses everything from attacks on infrastructure targets such as water
treatment plants, internet service providers, and train networks, to trespassing on
electronic resources of corporations and individuals (Holt and Bossler, 2014;
Kshetri, 2009; Nasi, Oksanen, Keipi, & Rasanen, 2015). Cybercrime differs from
street crime in several ways. First, given the complex and integrated nature of
targets (a security breach in one internet service provider could affect millions of
individual users) the scale of cybercrime, in terms of potential victims often
exceeds street crime. Yet, scale is not the only difference between cybercrime
and regular street crime. The biggest difference comes from the fact that people
4

living in separate countries can target individuals and organizations across the
globe (Ibrahim, 2016; Kshetri, 2016). Furthermore, anyone with access to a
computer can commit cybercrime (D'Ovidio, 2007; Holt and Bossler 2014).
Moreover, the victims of cybercrime often do not realize that they have been
targets of a crime (Kshetri, 2016). For example, if someone’s stolen personal
information was offered for sale on a cryptomarket then, unless the victim was
familiar with those types of websites, they would have no idea that their private
data was being bought by someone else.
On the other hand, cybercrime does share some similarities with predatory
street crimes (Grabosky, 2001; Dogaru, 2012). First, some street crimes have
cyber-comparatives, i.e., burglary is similar to breaking into secure sites to steal
information, digital property can be taken hostage by ransomware, and phishing
attacks are electronic frauds. Moreover, cybercrime motives are often the same
as street crime such as earning profit or earning respect from their peers
(Dupont, Cote, Savine, Decary-Hetu, 2016). Additionally, the reporting rates for
cybercrime are incredibly low which can be comparable to normal crime reporting
rates (Dogaru; ICCC, 2016; Kshetri, 2016); and, like street crime, cybercriminals
have been known to belong to groups and organized crime syndicates
(Broadhurst, Grabosky, Alazab, & Chon, 2014; LeukFeldt, Lavorgna, &
Kleemans, 2017).
It is important to study cybercrime because it is disruptive and costly. The
Internet Crime Complaint Center (ICCC) found that in 2016 victims’ losses
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reached about 1.33 billion dollars. A subset of these crimes that involved some
form of hacking were estimated to be about 527 million dollars. Notably, these
figures reflect crimes reported to the ICCC. Many cases go unreported due to
either the victim believing that law enforcement will not take them seriously,
confusion on whether their victimization is an actual crime, or because the victim
is unaware that they were involved in a crime (Kshetri, 2016). This means that
the 1.33-billion-dollar figure could be significantly higher.
Classification of Cybercrime
Taking a closer look at cybercrime, there are many different kinds (Dogaru
2012; D'Ovidio 2007; Doyle 2014; Holt and Bossler 2014; Leukfeldt, Kleemans, &
Stol 2016). Research by Holt and Bossler (2014) expanded upon Wall’s (2001)
four categories of cybercrime, resulting in a general classification scheme. The
first category is the cyber-trespassing, which is defined to include activities that
constitute the crossing of invisible boundaries to access computer infrastructures
that do not belong to the individual, i.e. hack into secure systems. Holt and
Bossler also found that hackers are very rare. This means that a small subset of
offenders engages in the prominent cybercrime cases that many see on
television.
The second category is cyber-deception and theft. Crimes included in this
category involve activities that are used to acquire another individual’s
information, such as their social security or credit card numbers, which are
subsequently used on the internet in furtherance of other crimes, i.e., identity
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theft, purchasing goods, and buying illicit products. While data acquisition
activities often involve hacking, cyber-deception and theft does not require the
use of computers. The cybercriminal can obtain personal information from
hardcopy documents that are discarded in the trash, left unsecured but still in the
victims’ possession, through deception, or breach of trust (from documents
viewed at work). Furthermore, these types of crimes do not require computer
expertise. For example, when a cybercriminal pretends to be a representative
calling from a bank, seeking a persons’ bank account number or password.
The third category that Holt and Bossler expanded upon was cyber-porn
and obscenity. This category involves the activity of individuals who have illegal
sexual interests that use the internet to acquire videos or pictures, arrange for the
production or dissemination of illicit material, or solicit illicit sex. An example of
which would be websites where sex offenders can trade pedophilia videos and
pictures amongst each other. Furthermore, cyber-porn and obscenity includes
activities involving the solicitation of sex with children and prostitutes. Revenge
porn, a phenomenon where individuals post pictures and videos of their sexual
partners without their consent, is also classified as cyber-porn and obscenity.
The final category of cybercrime involves two different forms of assaultive
behavior that are classed as cyberviolence. The first type of assaultive behavior
includes activities that target individuals, i.e., cyberstalking, harassment, or
threats of violence online. Research has shown that this is the highest type of
crime that youths experience (Nasi, Oksanen, Keipi, & Rasanen, 2015). The
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second type of assaultive behavior targets organizations and systems. For
example, when hacktivists break into a computer system not to steal information,
but to cause harm or to humiliate an organization they do not agree with, their
actions could be classified as assaultive behavior.
The focus of the present study is on preventing cyber-theft. This is
accomplished by examining the security advice given by members of hacking
communities who could be involved in cyber-trespassing and/or using cyber
deception to break into websites or computers to either steal information or to
show off. The scope of this paper does not include coders who are individuals
that create tools for hackers, i.e., Malware programs which activate on an
individual’s computer without their knowledge and steals information (Dogaru,
2012). Hacker tool creation is excluded from the study because these people do
not actively seek to commit cyber-theft they only create the tools.
Hacking and cyber-theft are important to focus for several reasons. First,
the ICCC reported that there was a total of 43,094 instances which involved
hacking. Second, there is a need for computer crime to be researched using
criminology theories (Willison & Siponen, 2009). Third, 64 percent of hacking
instances examined by the ICCC involved cybertheft of personal data. Typically,
someone had their own computer either hacked or compromised and their
personal information stolen.
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Hackers
The age of the typical cybercriminal ranges from 20-35. Most offenders
are predominantly male, and they are familiar with the system that they are trying
to break into or know people who are familiar with the systems (Dogaru, 2012).
Most hackers do not have a criminal history and have a good social status.
Individual motivations vary, but most people report that they are either motivated
by money or by their status (Dogaru, Holt and Bossler, 2014; Seebruck, 2015).
Finally, hackers can either work by themselves or in a group, however when
hackers do work in a group they are rarely organized (Choo, 2008; LeukFeldt,
Lavorgna, Kleemans, 2017).
Classifying hackers and hacking groups by both their skill level and
motivational factors, Seebruck (2015) created an updated typology model that
separated hacker motivation into five distinct categories: prestige, ideology,
profit, revenge, and finally recreation. To ensure flexibility, Seebruck’s typology
also allows for hacking groups and hackers to have multiple motivations for their
cybercrimes. This follows previous research which has suggested that
cybercrime groups typically do not have a strict leadership therefore individuals in
the group might initiate activity for different reasons (Broadhurst et. al., 2014).
Prestige hackers are those who hack to gain respect in a forum, website,
or other form of community. By reporting their exploits and the methods these
hackers hope to earn the trust of their peers, thus improving their position
(Dupont, Cote, Savine, & Decary-Hetu, 2016). This category can also include
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coders, people who develop the ways that hackers can break into systems
(Dogaru, 2012). Coders can also gain respect by providing tools for hackers in
other categories.
The next category in Seebruck’s (2015) typology are ideological hackers.
These individuals include those who refer to themselves as hacktivists. What this
means is that these individuals are aligned with a larger cause. Instead of using
their knowledge to earn trust or monetary gain, they use their skills for a so-called
greater good (Seebruck, 2015). The people in this category include groups like
Wikileaks who believe that information should be free to everyone. This category
can also include state actors such as those who created the Stuxnet virus to
attack the Iranian nuclear program.
The third category are those who are motivated by profit. The main
concern to this group is how to earn the greatest amount of money from
individuals or from businesses. These hackers primarily target personal
information that can be sold online, such as credit card and social security
numbers. Furthermore, they could use this information to make fraudulent
charges or take out loans in the individuals’ name.
The fourth type of hackers are those who are out for revenge. This group
believes that they have been wronged in some way and want to “get back” at
those who have wronged them. The prime example of this type of hacker is the
group Anonymous. For example, this group took down the Prime Ministers’
website after he sought to censor offensive content on the internet (Zetter, 2009).
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The final type of hackers are recreational hackers. This group participates
in hacking because they feel a need to challenge themselves or they want to
expand their skillset. Recreational hackers also post about their exploits to gain
attention. These are also the groups who attend hacking conventions to figure
new techniques and make connections within the community. While these
groups might want to know hacking for fun, there are also those who hack to
prove their abilities to their peers.
Harm
In total the ICC received 298,728 reports of cybercrime in the year 2016.
The group with the most victims were those who were over the age of 60 with
around 18.4% of victims. The next closest age group were those between the
ages of 30-39 with around 18.3% of victims. As for monetary losses, those over
60 suffered the most with an estimated loss of around 339,474,918 dollars.
Cybercriminals are just as susceptible to crime as non-criminals. This is
because even though some people have more technical skill and knowledge
about security, as a group, individuals are likely to spend a lot of time online, and
more exposure suggests a greater potential for victimization (Pratt, Holtfreter, &
Reisig, 2010). Since cybercriminals have more knowledge of the effectiveness of
security measures, their knowledge and experience with cyber-theft provides
great insight into internet enabled crime. Moreover, cybercriminals use the same
technology as non-cybercriminals. Therefore, their computers would contain the
same vulnerabilities that allow them to be hacked.
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After examining what cybercrime is and how it affects those who are
victims of it, one can see why figuring out which SCP techniques are effective
against it is important. It is also crucial to understand Rational Choice Theory
before applying SCP. This is because Rational Choice theory is one of the main
theories behind the SCP perspective.

Theoretical Framework
Rational Choice
The Rational Choice perspective is derived from two concepts:
utilitarianism, and traditional economic choice theory (Adler, Mueller, & Laufer,
2010). What these two theories state is first; all choices people make are to
maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Second, is that people will weigh their
options and choose whichever option will satisfy their needs the most. Rational
Choice combines these two idea to theorize that criminals will make the
decisions from those two theories intelligently and with free will. This means that
when someone goes out and commits a crime they do so because they conclude
that the possible benefit of that crime outweighs the possible costs of getting
caught. Furthermore, when they make that decision, they are not influenced by
any other factors besides their own decision-making process (Adler, Mueller, &
Laufer, 2010).
McCarthy (2002) theorized that there are nine general assumptions that
Rational Choice makes about offenders. (1) People have desired outcomes that
they would like to achieve. (2) Those outcomes are complete, transitive, and
12

stable, meaning that they have a least desirable outcome and most desirable
outcome. Furthermore, there is a consistency to the outcomes that are desired.
(3) Present and future benefits influence people’s preferences. This means that
to take a future option that benefit must be greater than the present offer. (4)
Outcomes are not set in stone, in other words, uncertainty influences a person’s
preferences. (5) People use the information that they accumulated to base their
assessments on costs and benefits. (6) Rational actions are based on the above
assumptions. (7) Is the assumption that rational choice perspective does not
assume everyone will make the most rational decisions and that emotional states
influence choices. (8) People’s choices fall into either a decision or game theory
approach. Decision theory means that only that one person’s decision and
chance affect the outcome. Game theory states that more than one persons’
decision influences the outcome. Finally, (9) is the assumption that rational
choice is not a theory of cognation. This means that it does not posit that there is
a right way to think, only that people’s choices are consistent.
Another important aspect to look at is how offenders choose their targets.
Research looking at burglaries, the closest approximation to cyber-trespassing,
found that many different factors are at play when a burglar chooses their targets
(Townsley, Birks, Ruiter, Bernasco, & White, 2015). Preferences, morality, and
ease of access have all been found to be related to target selection (Breetzke
and Cohn, 2013; Taylor, 2014; Townsley et. al., 2015). Research on drug dealers
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also showed that those who looked easy to rip off were targeted (Jacques, Allen,
& Wright, 2014).
There are two important ideas that can be taken away after examining
Rational Choice Theory. First, is that criminals make choices that are rational.
Second, is that these choices are based on the factors surrounding the crime
they want to commit. What these two ideas mean is that there is a clear way to
dissuade criminals from committing crimes. This means that there is a clear way
to dissuade criminals from committing crimes. To accomplish this, according to
Rational Choice, one must make the cost of committing a crime outweigh the
benefits.
The next perspective looked at, SCP, aims to increase the disadvantages
of committing a crime. It is reasoned that increasing disadvantages over
anticipated rewards would lead potential offenders to refrain from committing a
specific crime. Disrupting rational decision-making process will prevent crimes.
Since hacking is often a pre-cursor crime to cyber-theft, it follows that if
cybercriminals were dissuaded from hacking, the cybertheft should decrease as
well.
Situational Crime Prevention
Situational Crime Prevention is a perspective that builds off many theories
such as Rational Choice Theory, Routine Activities, and Deterrence theories of
crime. To fully understand this perspective this section first outlines what SCP is
and the perspectives’ main aspects. Next, this section examines how offenders
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could use SCP to defend against threats. Finally, this section looks at how this
relates to cybercriminals and their decision-making process, as well as, why one
should examine their use of SCP.
The main objective of Situational Crime Prevention is to remove the
opportunities for crime (Clarke, 2010). To facilitate a comprehensive approach to
opportunity reduction, Clarke proposes a framework comprised of 25 techniques
that aim to persuade a potential criminal offender that the cost of committing a
crime outweighs the benefit of that crime, whilst removing excuses for criminal
activity. Clarke (2010) also posits that the opportunity-reducing measures have
three components. The first is that they are directed at a specific form of crime.
The second is that it involves some sort of change in an environment that is as
permanent as possible. Finally, these changes make crime riskier to the offender
or provide the offender with less reward. SCP does not seek to explain the crime,
but to prevent the crime from taking place (Clarke, 2010).
Clarke (2010) proposes that there are five aspects that if modified, can
prevent crime, by influencing the offender’s assessment of crime opportunity—
increasing the effort required to commit the crime, increasing the risks of
detection and apprehension, reducing the rewards that may accrue from the
crime, removing the provocations that may trigger offending behavior, and finally,
removing the excuses that may be used by offenders to justify their actions.
Within each category, Clarke (2010) proposes specific opportunity reducing
techniques, resulting in a total of 25 opportunity reducing techniques that can be
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applied to dissuade criminals from choosing and acting against targets. In the
text that follows, I explain the SCP framework in greater depth.
The first category proposed by SCP is to increase the effort it takes for a
criminal to commit a crime. Within this category are five techniques: target
hardening, control access to facilities, screen exits, deflect offenders, and control
tools. Target hardening involves making the victim harder for potential criminals
to access. Examples of which include: steering wheel locks, deadbolts for doors
and bars covering windows. The next technique is to control access to facilities.
For example, having a pass code to gain access to potential burglary targets.
Screening exits involves placing mechanisms or personnel in such a position that
there is continual surveillance of egress, i.e., having a security guard at the exit
door or attaching merchandise tags that emit a sound when leaving through a
door. The fourth technique is to deflect offenders. This involves making it difficult
for an offender to commit the crime. An example of this would involve having
separate seats for fans of opposing teams at a sporting event. Finally, Clarke
(2010) argues that increasing the effort to commit a crime could be accomplished
by controlling the tools used to commit the crime. This would mean restricting the
sale of certain products like medicine or bolting down chairs in bars.
The next category is increasing the risk of detection and apprehension.
For this category the first technique is to extend guardianship. For example,
when leaving for the night one would keep a light on to give the illusion that
somebody was home. Next, is assist natural surveillance, this would entail cutting
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down branches in a heavily shadowed area. The third technique is to reduce
anonymity, for instance using real names as users on a computer. Next, is to use
place managers, these would include security cameras or more cashiers in a gas
station. Finally, is to strengthen formal surveillance. What this means is to have
systems in place like burglar alarms.
The next category is to reduce the rewards offenders may gain from
criminal activity. The first technique is to conceal the target, for instance keeping
high valued electronics behind the counter of an electronics store. The next
technique is to remove the targets. An example of this would be steering wheels
that are detachable and are brought with the driver. Next is to identify property,
i.e. vehicle identification numbers, thus, making it harder to sell on the black
market. The fourth technique is to disrupt those markets. For example, cracking
down on websites that sell private information. Finally, is to deny the benefits, for
example, safes that permanently lock after too many wrong passwords.
Next, is to reduce provocations that induce crime. The techniques in this
category include reducing frustration and stress such as creating an orderly
venue during sporting events. After that, is to avoid disputes between people.
Next, is to reduce the temptation and arousal such as banning prostitution.
Fourth, is to neutralize peer pressure. Finally, is to discourage imitation such as
fixing broken windows.
The last category is to remove excuses for crimes. The techniques used in
this category are first to set rules. This could mean anything from lease
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agreements to no loitering signs. The next technique is to post instructions. For
example, signs specifying where to park. After that, is to alert their conscience.
This includes posting signs about the harm of shoplifting. The next technique is
to assist compliance. This means to have facilities for homeless people and
regular people to use the restroom. Finally, is to control drugs and alcohol. An
example of this would be the breathalyzer in a car needed to start.
There have been numerous studies that have investigated the utility of the
SCP framework and the effectiveness of specific techniques in reducing crime
(Clarke, 2010). For example, research on steering wheel locks has shown
significant reductions in motor vehicle thefts (Webb, 1994). SCP has also been
shown to reduce prostitution, obscene phone calls, burglary, car crime, as well as
return fraud (Anderson & Pease, 1994; Challinger, 1996; Clarke, 1990;
Matthews,1990). Andresen and Felson (2010) also showed that SCP can be
used in unison with other theories to develop effective and comprehensive crime
reduction initiative. Researchers in this study combined SCP with co-offender
theories to broaden SCP’s scope to include social crimes. (Andresen and Felson,
2010).
Furthermore, SCP has been used to develop strategies to defend
computer systems. Willison and Siponen (2009) came up with a modified version
of Clarke’s SCP that applied each of the 25 techniques to computer systems.
Research by Hinduja and Kooi (2013) also found that applying SCP would
benefit the information security sector.
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In the research study by Willison and Siponen (2009) they used crime
scripts to tie insider computer crime with SCP. They showed that practitioners
could use crime scripts to come up with effective SCP opportunity reduction
techniques that would benefit their specific needs. Furthermore, the researchers
showed that SCP could be applied to cybercrime by providing some examples of
opportunity reduction techniques that focused on computer crime. In the
conclusion of their paper Willison and Siponen called for computer crime to be
examined through criminology theories.
Finally, Hinduja and Kooi (2013) posit that SCP can be applied to
information security (InfoSec). They go on to state that not all aspects of SCP
can be applied and that there are only 16 of the 25 techniques that can be
applied. These researchers also state that there are two main limitations to how
SCP can be applied to InfoSec. The first is that there is cause for concern for
adding more surveillance to the online ecosystem. Second, they state that it
takes time for security measures to be implemented making it difficult to
implement when the InfoSec world changes rapidly.
Offenders’ use of Situation Crime Prevention
Offenders are often overlooked when it comes to research about victims.
However, offenders routinely employ techniques to protect themselves from law
enforcement, other criminals, or from upset customers (Jacques, Allen, & Wright,
2014; Jacques and Reynald, 2012; Piza and Sytsma 2016). Some techniques

19

that offenders use vary by the time of day that their activities take place in (Piza
and Sytsma, 2016).
Looking closely at the research: Piza and Sytsma (2016); Dickinson and
Wright (2015); Jacques, Allen, and Wright (2014); and Jacques and Reynald
(2012) all looked at offenders as victims. Piza and Sytsma (2016) and Dickinson
and Wright (2015) both examined how drug dealers defend themselves from law
enforcement. Piza and Sytsma’s (2016) research involved the defensive
techniques of open-air drug dealers, those who sell on the street, in New Jersey.
Using the Newark Police Departments security cameras, researchers were able
to identify that drug dealers preferred to operate out of view of place managers,
people who regularly interact with the street. Furthermore, they found that drug
dealers used situational prevention techniques in the spots where they stashed
their drugs. Dickinson and Wright (2015) also examined how drug dealers use
gossip to protect themselves from being arrested. Using data from interviews
with drug dealers’ researchers found that they used that information to make
informed choices as to when to stop selling, who to avoid, and what strategies
they use to avoid these threats.
Jacques, Allen, and Wright (2014) looked at drug buyers and the choices
that drug dealers make when they defraud them. Using interviews with drug
dealers the researchers found that those who are unlikely to retaliate or are
unable to take their business somewhere else are most likely to be ripped-off.
Jacques and Reynald (2012) looked at drug dealers as victims. Seeking to
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examine whether offenders use situational prevention techniques to defend
themselves from victimization, the researchers conducted interviews with 50 drug
dealers. What they found was that offenders employed all five main categories of
SCP, increasing the effort; increase the risks; reduce the rewards; reduce
provocation; and remove excuses, in some form to protect themselves.
While normal citizens must worry about criminals taking advantage of
them or harming them and businesses must worry about upset customers,
offenders often must worry about both as well as law enforcement (Jacques and
Reynald, 2012). There are also drug buyers who are typically victims of crimes
(Jacques, Allen, & Wright, 2014).
As Jacques and Reynald (2012) pointed out, there is a need to
understand offenders’ use of techniques to defend themselves because there are
some techniques that are unknown to most people. Most people would not know
the intricacies of the criminal world and what methods are truly effective in
protecting oneself from crime. Understanding the criminals’ perspective allows
individuals to gleam the most effective ways to protect themselves. This is
because these are the people who commit the crimes, therefore, the methods
they employ will be the most effective measures to stop those types of crimes.
These techniques, while not tailored to the cybersecurity field, have been
used by Willson and Sipinen (2009) in a cybersecurity orientation. There are two
main limitations to this study that the current study seeks to resolve. First, is that
this study looks at preventing crime from an InfoSec perspective. The techniques

21

recommended are geared towards practitioners in the corporate world. Second,
the study only focuses on one case of criminal behavior and does not have a
sample.

Table 1. Situational Crime Prevention Table Applied to Cybersecurity
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Current Study
The reason cybercrime should be investigated is because cybercriminals
are just as much victims to online attacks as regular citizens. Research has
shown that the more time spent online means the likelihood of being a target of
internet crime is increased (Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010). Therefore, knowing
how hackers defend themselves gives more insight into how average citizens
can defend themselves. This ties into what Jacques and Reynald (2012) said
about regular criminals. There is a need to know the strategies criminals employ
to better protect ourselves.
The reason there is a need to understand criminal techniques is because
they are experts in their field. Therefore, if they want to protect themselves from
the crime that they commit, then they should know what will stop other criminals
in that same category. This is particularly true for hackers’ knowledge because
most computers operate in the same way. Thus, the techniques that they
recommend for their own sub-group will work on non-criminal’s computers just as
effectively. There is also a need to look at whether this advice could be used by
computer novices or those with expert levels of computer knowledge.
Examining the body of research, there are few studies that examine what
cybercriminals protect themselves from. It can be inferred that the same criminal
risks that exist for regular people exist for cybercriminals because of the amount
of time that they spend on the computer (Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010).
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Malware and Phishing attempts do not discriminate when it comes from sources
that are anonymous. Furthermore, one can assume that to gain respect, a hacker
might try to break into another fellow hacker’s computer. Thus, the same kind of
decision making process might occur in cybercriminals minds as those of regular
individuals.
As stated above, there is a limited amount of research on offenders as
victims. Furthermore, even if high-profile hacks are a popular subject in the news,
there is little research on techniques to defend oneself from hacking. This current
study seeks to close both gaps by examining the protection techniques used by
those in the hacking community.
The primary goal of this exploratory study is to document the techniques
that hackers use to defend themselves online. Specifically,
Q1. Do the protection techniques of hackers fit within the framework of
SCP?
Furthermore, if they do use SCP techniques, then which categories are
most likely to be recommended? The reason one should look at these techniques
is because if the individuals who are entrenched in the hacking community are
using these methods, then those methods would be effective for the online habits
of everyone. Second,
Q2. What level of expertise is needed to follow the advice recommended
by the hacker community?
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The reason this question is important is to determine whether these
techniques can be used to protect average citizens from becoming victims of
cybercrime.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

Data Source
Data were collected by performing a content analysis of 24 websites that
have some connection to the hacking community (see Appendix 1 for list).
Qualifying websites included having some connection to the hacking world, for
example sites that are dedicated to hacking news or strategies. Furthermore,
these sites must not be selling some security software or service. The sites that
met these criteria were found using a basic google search using the terms
“hacking”, “hacking community”, “hacking forums”, and “hacking sites” as well as
through websites that linked other hacking related websites. The reason for this
terminology is that these terms are the best descriptors available for those who
hack. Examining these sites, three main categories were observed: forums, fan
pages, and static posts/blogs. It is important to note that the only Fan Page
website that was included within this analysis was the website Reddit. From
these sources, units of measurement were collected from each webpage.1
1. Forums are websites that contain message boards for a subject (see
Figure 1). Inside of these message boards users make posts that other users can
then respond with their own posts. Forums must be created by individuals who

1

Originally this project sought to capture videos, however there was not enough video sites with accessible
data to search through. Furthermore, this project wanted to capture exposure rate of each technique
recommended. Still, like videos there was not enough data to capture this metric.
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understand how to code webpages and must pay for a server to host their
website and forums typically only cover one subject area. Users of these forums
can take on multiple roles. For example, there are administrators who run the
website, moderators (mods) who control what people can post on these forums,
as well as, control which parts of the forums other members can access. Finally,
there are users who can only post and read what the moderators allow them.
Some forums have systems in place where an individual must register for the
community before they can view or interact with posts. In total two major forums
were found in the initial search. The posts inside of the forum were the unit of
measurement collected. Furthermore, any replies by users were included in the
analysis.
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Figure 1. Forums (hackforums.net)

2. Fan pages are categorized, like forums, as places where users can post
topics of conversations for others to post replies. Fan pages can be created by
any individual. These pages are then hosted on a larger website alongside other
fan pages of varied interests. For instance, there can be one fan page created
about dogs and another fan page about hacking all on the same website. Fan
page websites have their own administrators and moderators that can control
any fan page. Individual fan pages can then have their own set of administrators
and moderators. Finally, users of these larger sites can visit these fan pages and
post onto them once they become members of that community. There are some
fan pages that make entry into their community restricted. What this means is if
an individual wants to read the fan page one of those fan page’s that are
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restricted, then an admin would have to approve them. Four fan pages were
included in this initial search from the larger fan page site Reddit. Like forums,
posts and user interactions were collected as the unit of measurement.

Figure 2. Fan Page (reddit.com/r/hacking/)

3. Static posts/blogs were the most prevalent data source. Static posts are
blogs or websites (see Figure 3) that display articles that are written by people
knowledgeable in the hacking field or participate in hacking activities. These
websites contain information either to teach or to inform users. Interaction
amongst users within these types of websites is limited. For instance, some
websites do not have comment sections. Data were pulled directly from the
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article. Also, if there is a comment section, data were pulled from those
interactions. In total, there were 18 blogs included in this study.

Figure 3. Static/Blog (thehackerblog.com)

Sample
For blogs and forums, a search was performed looking for posts that
contain tips and strategies for protecting oneself online. For fan pages first, a
search was performed within the site using the terms “hacking”, “hacking
community”, and “hackers”. This allowed the finding of hacking communities on
these sites. Next, like with blog posts, a search was conducted on strategies that
one can use to protect themselves online.
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Data collection lasted from 12/21/2017 to 01/16/2018. In total, 134
websites were identified, and from those websites, 24 contained useable
information. Two of these 24 sites were forums, four were fan pages, and finally,
18 were static posts/blogs (75% of sites examined were static posts or blogs).
The pages used in this study were found by using the search terms “security”,
“protection”, “safety”, “protect”, “protect yourself”, “protection tips” and “safety
tips” within the various sites. It was found that 85 web pages had information
useful for this study. Within those pages, I found 379 references to specific
protection techniques; notably, some techniques were mentioned several times.
Data Analysis
Data were processed through the qualitative data analysis software NVivo.
NVivo was chosen as the software to analyze this data because of its
functionality and previous use in a cybercrime study (Hutchison, Johnston, &
Breckon, 2010). For example, NVivo allows for a quantitative analysis on
qualitative data (Bazeley, 2002). This means that even with a large amount of
qualitative data, analysis can be done in a shorter and more efficient time.
Moreover, research by Barratt, Lenton, Maddox, and Allen (2016) used the
software to analyze interviews with cryptomarket users.
Each strategy named in a webpage as a technique that could be deployed
by an individual to being victimized was captured as a node. To code blog posts,
first each relevant article page was downloaded through the NVivo capture tool
on the Chrome browser. Next, the page was examined for techniques
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recommended. Coding forums worked like fan pages. First, all posts that showed
up either asking for tips or offering tips on protection, were downloaded through
the same software as blog articles and stored within the NVivo software. Next,
the entire post along with user comments were examined and any mention of
protection techniques were coded into the appropriate node.
In addition, each technique was rated as either expert, meaning the advice
was intended for users with extensive computer knowledge, or novice, which was
advice where little to no computer knowledge was needed. A piece of advice was
considered expert if that advice recommended strategies that involved a user
either changing computer coding or other actions that could not be set in a
program’s settings. An advice was coded as novice if a user could accomplish
that advice with little to no effort or simple setting changes.
Once found, the technique was highlighted and coded into a node on the
NVivo software. Each node was labeled with one of the 25 opportunity reducing
techniques of SCP (see Table 2). For example, if a blog article recommends a
specific anti-virus, then that part of the article was coded into the node labeled
Target Hardening. Or, if someone asks a question on which firewall to use on
their computer and a user responds with a certain firewall, then that answer was
coded into the Target Hardening node. The full list of 25 opportunity reducing
techniques of SCP was on hand to ensure reliable coding. Examples for each
technique were drawn from a prior study of cyber SCP by Willson and Sipinen
(2009). However, if a technique was not represented within the five categories,
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then that technique was placed under the best fitting technique. Furthermore, if a
strategy closely matched other techniques then only one was chosen.
In addition to a generating an updated catalogue of prevention strategies,
this study aimed to reveal how advanced each technique being advocated. First,
a tally of each technique advocated from the data pulled by NVivo revealed
which techniques the hacking community value the most. These were then
matched with one of the 25 opportunity reducing techniques as closely as
possible, an example of which can be seen in Table 2. After everything was
matched the techniques advocated the most are shown in the table.

Table 2. Situational Crime Prevention Table
Increase the
effort
1. Target
Hardening

Increase the
risks
6. Extend
guardianship

2. Control
Access to
facilities
3. Screen
Exits

7. Assist
natural
surveillance
8. Reduce
anonymity

4. Deflect
Offenders

9. Utilize
place
managers

5. Control
10.
tools/weapons Strengthen
formal
surveillance

Reduce the
Rewards
11.
Conceal
Targets
12.
Remove
targets
13. Identify
property

Reduce
Provocation
16. Reduce
Frustrations
and stress
17. Avoid
disputes

Remove
excuses
21. Set
rules

18. Reduce
emotional
arousal

23. Alert
conscience

14. Disrupt
Markets

19.
Neutralize
peer
pressure
20.
Discourage
imitation

24. Assist
compliance

15. Deny
Benefits
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22. Post
instructions

25. Control
drugs and
alcohol

During data collection it was found that no category was present in every
source, as seen in Table 3. Across 85 separate pages, 68%2 contained some
form of Increase the Effort and 67% of pages contained techniques related to
Reducing the Rewards. Increasing the Risks were only present in 36% of pages
and 31% of pages contained Reduce Provocation techniques. Finally, no page
had techniques that related to remove excuses. In terms of skill sets, 77 pages
advocated prevention strategies that could be used by novice computer users.
On the other hand, only 21 pages contained advice intended for those with
expert levels of computer knowledge. Some of these pages contained both
expert and novice advice.

2

Percentages do not add up to 100% because one source could contain multiple techniques. For example,
one page could have Increase the Effort as well as Reduce Provocation.
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Table 3. Sample Description, n=85 pages
Variable

Frequency

Percent

Forums

20

24%

Fan Pages

17

20%

Static Posts/Blogs

48

56%

Increase the effort

58

68%

Increase the risks

31

36%

Reduce the Rewards

57

67%

Reduce Provocation

26

31%

Remove excuses

0

0%

Sources

Technique Category
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

This results chapter is organized as follows. First, a table is shown
detailing the different techniques of SCP and their representation within the data.
Next, this section shows examples the most recommended strategies by the
hacking community. This is then supplemented with quotes that were used to
create these samples. Finally, this section answers the second research question
posed about whether the techniques recommended could be used by those with
limited computer knowledge.

Prevalence of Opportunity Reducing Techniques
The primary impetus to this study was to determine whether the
cybercrime protection techniques discussed within the hacker community fit
within the framework of SCP. If the SCP framework was feasible, then the inquiry
turned to investigating which class of techniques were most prevalent. Table 3
reports how the sample of 379 advisements, found within 85 unique webpages,
fits within the SCP framework. Of note, there were no instances of suggestions
that fit any of the categories within the removing excuses technique. The two
most prevalent categories were increase the effort and reduce the rewards, 34%
and 46% respectively. Table 4 reports how common opportunity reducing
technique were relative to each other (N=379 coding’s).
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Table 4. Results
Increase the
Effort

Increase the
Risks

Reduce the
Rewards

Reduce
Provocation

34% (128)

11% (41)

46% (174)

9% (36)

Target Hardening

Extend Guardianship

Conceal Targets

Reduce
Frustrations &
Stress

12% (45)

2% (9)

18% (69)

0(0)
Control Access to
Facilities

8% (30)
Screen Exits
.2% (1)
Deflect Offenders:
13% (48)
Control
tools/weapons
1 % (4)

Assist Natural
Surveillance

Remove targets

.7 % (3)

27% (101)

Reduce anonymity

Identify property

0

0

Utilize place
managers

Disrupt Markets
0

4% (17)
Strengthen formal
surveillance

Deny Benefits
1% (4)

3% (12)

Avoid Disputes

.5% (2)
Reduce emotional
arousal
1% (4)
Neutralize peer
pressure
0
Discourage
imitation:
8% (30)

Note: Percentages are based on grand total

Increase Effort
Within this category the most common technique mentioned was deflecting
offenders (13% of coding). Advice given included the following:
•

“Use Pegasus or Thunderbird (by Mozilla), or a web-based program such
as Hotmail or Yahoo (In Firefox).”

•

“Use Strong passwords”
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•

“While you download files from untrusted websites/sources such as
torrents, warez etc. make sure that you run a virus scan before executing
them.”

Exploring the frequency with which each strategy was mentioned, using a
strong password showed up the most frequently with 9 instances. Next, were
recommendations to use safer software such as Firefox or Linux (6 instances)
and to change passwords often (6 instances). After that was the suggestion to
use software to block automated processes on websites such as pop-ups and
scripts which had 5 recommendations. Finally, was to use a sandbox software to
open suspicious files which appeared 3 times in the coding.
Two other techniques were commonly suggested—Target Hardening and
Controlling Access to Facilities (a.k.a. controlling access to the computer). About
12% of all advice mentioned techniques that could be classed as target
hardening. Of note within the 45 codings, the most frequently mentioned tactic
was installing anti-virus or anti-malware programs with 22 instances. Other
examples within this technique are:
•

“Install Adaware”

•

“Install a good Antivirus/Anti-spyware”

•

“spend a few bucks on a good anti-spyware program”
Not as common, but worth mentioning were the 30 instances of advice

falling within the technique, controlling access to facilities (8% of all coding). The
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two most noteworthy recommended strategies were to use a firewall with 8
instances and use a password with 5 instances. Examples of other advice in this
category include:
•

“Restricted Connectivity”,

•

“Enabling HTTPS for all logins and wp-admin”,

•

“Restrict Direct Access to Plugin and Theme PHP files”

The remaining five suggestions were coded as Control tools (1%) or
Screen exits (.2%). Examples follow:
•

Control Tools:
o “Restrict administrative privileges to operating systems and
applications based on user duties”
o “Don't make someone teach u hacking,better learn by
urself.”

•

Screen exits:
o “first thing you should do is spoofing your mac-address.”

Increase the Risks
Within this category were 11% of the total coding within this category were
first Utilize Place Managers that had 4% of the total coding. The strategies of
note were to use third-party websites to examine web traffic with 6 instances.
This was followed by using a third-party website to look for flaws inside of a
server and to use Virus Total to scan files before opening them with 3 and 2
respectively. Some other recommendations include:
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•

“Download from known sites”,

•

“Use two factor authentication as much as possible.”,

•

“Scan suspicious files using VirusTotal before downloading it”

Next, was Strengthen Formal Surveillance with 3% of the total coding.
Within this category the most frequently recommended strategy was to run some
sort of scan on your important files with 8 instances. Other examples of advice
are:
•

“Scan your PC once a week”,

•

“First and foremost, you don’t want to limit yourself to one antivirus
program.”,

•

“Perform an endemic test at the documents/e-mail attachments
which you down load before executing them.”

After that, the next category with coding was Extend Guardianship with
2% of the total coding. Of note within this category is that the hacking community
suggested to regularly check any activity on important data. Other examples of
this category include:
•

“Before opening a program always scan it”,

•

“take a look at the list of applications installed on your smartphone.
If you notice a dubious application, get rid of it right away”

•

“Always Check the URL in the Address Bar”
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Finally, in this category was Assist Natural Surveillance with .7% of the
coding examples of which are:
•

“Always type the URL of the site in the address bar to get into the
site. Do not click on a hyperlink to enter the site”

•

“The best way to defend against the “Trusted Contact” Facebook
scam is to contact the friend directly. Not by email or text, make
sure it is in person or at least over the phone”

Reducing Rewards
It was found that the category used most by the hacking community was
Reducing Rewards with 46% of the total coding. Within this category the most
prevalent technique was Remove Targets at 27%. Within this technique not
clicking on suspicious links is the most recommended strategy with 11 instances
found within the coding’s. The next strategy most recommended is to not use
public computers/Wi-Fi with 10 instances. After that, is to only visit secure and
trusted websites and do not download or click on suspicious emails with 7
instances each. The last strategy recommended of note is to not install plug-in
and toolbars onto your browser with 5 instances. Some other examples of
remove targets are:
•

“Do not click on unsolicited email”

•

“Don’t install toolbars”

•

“Do not click on popups”
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•

“NEVER double-click the pen drive to open it. Instead right-click on
it and select the option ‘open’”

•

“Secondly, don’t click on a link in an email or social media message
that sounds suspicious.”

Next, was Conceal Targets which had 18% of the coding’s. Within this
category the strategy most recommended was use a VPN when browsing the
internet which had 23 instances. After that, the next strategy that was
recommended was to encrypt your data with 13 instances. Next, with 7 instances
inside of the coding’s was to use a Virtual Machine on your computer. The final
two strategies recommended with 5 instances each are use an anonymous
browser like Tor and use a password management software. Some other
examples of this technique are:
•

“disable the on- screen SMS previews”,

•

“Encrypt Your Wireless Router Connection”,

•

“Never Put Author Usernames on Display”

Finally, the last represented technique is Deny Benefits with 1% of the
total coding. Examples of this include:
•

“keeping around a known-good firmware image and wiping your
hard drive + reflashing the firmware every month.”

•

“Android Device Manager”
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Reduce Provocation
This category contained 9% of the total amount of coding. Within this
category was Discourage Imitation with 8% of the sample. Within this category
the most recommended strategy, both inside the technique and in the entirety of
the sample, was to keep your software and devices updated with 30 instances.
Recommendations include:
•

“It is highly recommended that you turn on the automatic update
feature”,

•

“Install Updates Frequently”,

•

“Patch everything, immediately.”

Next, was Reduce Emotional Arousal with 1% of the coding, examples include:
•

“Revert the SSO system back to OAuth 2”

•

“Change your default passwords.”

Finally, at .5 percent was Avoid Disputes examples of which are:
•

“Don't try to hack others”

•

“Change your default passwords.”

The category Remove Excuses were not represented within the coding.
Level of Expertise
Q2. What level of expertise is the advice recommended by the hacker
community geared towards?
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It was found that most of techniques were being recommended for those with
novice levels of computer knowledge. There was a total of 77 out of the 85 pages
that contained strategies that could be used by those with novice levels of
computer knowledge. On the other hand, expert level of advice was only found
on 21 out of the 85 pages. Novice also comprised 90% of the total codings.
Some examples of these types of codes are:
Novice:
•

“You also need multiple passwords for all your accounts and never share
critical software passwords with non-critical software”,

•

“Scan your PC once a week”,

•

“Secure your mobile phone with a password or with another method such
as fingerprint recognition but do not unlock it when it is in charging”,

•

“Always install a terrific antivirus software program”

Expert:
•

“Resolve the subdomain takeover of saostatic.uber.com by removing the
dangling CNAME to AWS CloudFront CDN”,

•

“Restrict Access to wp-admin Directory”,

•

“Make a // entry in config.php that displays the WordPress table prefix
used in the installation”,

•

“Filter MAC Addresses”
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

Examining the results, three themes emerge from this study. These
themes include: hacker opportunities, routine protections, and finally, the difficulty
encountered in applying the Situational Crime Prevention framework when
coding recommendations. The first theme that will be presented is on hacker
opportunities. This section will first, cover the motivations of the typical hacker.
Next, this section will present how studying hacker opportunities can be used to
protect victims. Finally, this section will cover how the limitations of this study
could influence the results, along with where future research should focus.
The second theme that will be discussed is Routine Precautions. First, this
section will talk about what Routine Precaution theory posits and how that is
related to internet crime. Next, this section will address what Felson and Clarke
(2010) suggest to encourage people to take the correct routine precautions. After
that, this section will go over the routine precautions that are shown from the
results of this study. Finally, limitations to this project, as well as, areas for future
research will be presented.
The last theme this chapter will cover are the difficulties in applying
Situational Crime Prevention. This first part of this section will go over what areas
of SCP were not represented in the results of this study. This section then
proceeds to go over why internet crimes might not fit within the SCP framework.
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Finally, this section will go over how the limitations in coding could have caused
this and how future research might solve this problem.

Hacker Opportunities
While the image of large scale hacking groups breaking into sophisticated
security systems dominates the media, the results of this study suggest that
hackers are not wary of sophisticated attacks. By examining the protection
strategies recommended by the hacking community a clear theme emerges. This
theme reveals that hackers are not concerned by highly-skilled hacking, but small
scale, simple opportunistic hacking. The advice featured in the hacking
community recommendations focuses on common sense protection methods, not
complicated security practices. For example: patching software, not clicking on
suspicious items, and running virus scans on files before opening them are all
advice that thwart those hackers who are relying on human mistakes to carry out
their attacks. This is further shown by the fact that 90% of all strategies
recommended could be used by those with novice levels of experience.
These findings are indirectly supported by several studies investigating
hacker motivations. First, a survey performed by the security company Thycotic
(2014) revealed, in their sample of 127 self-identified hackers attending a
hacking conference, that 51% of the hackers said that they hacked for the fun
and thrill of hacking. This finding is also supported by research conducted by
Madarie (2017). In their study they administered a survey to 71 self-identified
hackers to figure out the underlying motives behind why they hack. Part of their
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findings suggested that hackers rated intellectual challenge and curiosity as the
highest motivational factor behind why they circumvent security systems. This is
followed by peer recognition and respect. The least rated motivational factor
hackers rated was money. While Madarie also found that these motivating
factors did not determine how often they participated in hacking, it does suggest
that hacking to go after large sums of money from their victims is rare. Finally,
Turge-GoldSchmidt (2005) interviewed 54 Israeli hackers as to why they hack
and found that the most stated motivating factor for their hacking activities was
fun, thrills, and excitement. In their interviews only one hacker said that economic
reasons were why they hacked. So the most immediate threat is posed by
opportunistic thrill seekers, no bands of committed and highly-skilled criminal
entrepreneurs motivated by profit goals.
Policy Implications
The findings in this study suggest that hackers are not concerned with
sophisticated attacks on their systems. Drawing upon Seebruck’s (2015) updated
typology of hacker, and in consideration that most hackers act out of a desire for
thrill and excitement rather than profit, the results of the current study suggest
that hackers are more concerned with the threats posed by opportunist and
recreational hackers. These are the hackers who do so for the fun and thrill of
exploiting a mistake someone makes in their browsing habits. To combat this,
users should forget about the dramatized vision of the hackers who break
through the toughest of security to steal their data. This mentality leads to users
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thinking that there is nothing they can do to prevent them getting their personal
information. This is false, as the most recent Thyoctic (2017) survey shows, 85%
of the hackers agreed that most data breeches are caused by human error. This
shows there must be a shift in thinking that hacking is inevitable to hacking can
be prevented with the right precautions taken.
Limitations
There are some limitations to this project that could interfere with the
conclusions drawn from this theme. The most important of which is that there is
no way to assess the effectiveness of each strategy, proving the strategy was
deployed correctly. Because of this, this project can only make assumptions
based on the prevalence of each strategy recommended.
Future Research
Future research should examine the effectiveness of these techniques to
determine if the recommended prevention strategies are in fact, the most
effective ways of preventing cybertheft. This would allow researchers to say for
certain that these strategies are effective for stopping opportunistic hackers.
Future researchers should also interview hackers about their safety concerns.
This would then reveal what are the exact fears that hackers have when
browsing online.
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Routine Precautions
Suppose all situational controls were abandoned: no locks, no
custom controls, cash left for parking in an open pot for occasional
collection, no library checkouts, no baggage screening at airports,
no ticket checks at train stations, no traffic lights, etc. Would there
be no change in the volume of crime and disorder? (Tilley and
Laycock, 2002:31).

The above quote ties into the second theme that can be drawn from the
findings. This theme is tied to the theory of routine precautions. This theory,
developed by Felson and Clarke (2010), posits that throughout our lives we
naturally take precautions against crime. For example, locking doors, avoiding
certain places, and staying inside at night are all precautions that many take
without thinking. Felson and Clark suggest that this theory is another important
aspect in the prevention of crime.
Felson and Clark state that society is governed by three forms of control:
informal, formal, and routine precautions. Informal control is where society helps
to control crime. For instance, if someone strange enters the neighborhood and
starts to mess with a person’s car and that person’s neighbor intervenes to either
stop the perpetrator, or call the neighbor to explain the situation. Formal control is
the criminal justice system that seeks to prevent these types of crimes from
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happening. Finally, there are the routine precautions that each citizen takes to
prevent their own victimization.
Felson and Clarke (2010) argue that some global social trends are
weakening informal and formal controls. For example, in today’s society people
are strangers to one another thus weakening the informal controls. Furthermore,
advances in technology help criminals become more anonymous weakening
formal controls. Felson and Clarke (2010) suggest that these declines in informal
and formal controls will lead to the rise in routine precautions. Felson and Clark
also speculate that through the rise in technology these declines will happen
faster. This can clearly be seen with the technological advances brought about
by the internet. With the internet there are few informal controls that can stop
someone from becoming a victim of identity fraud or some other crime.
Moreover, law enforcement is powerless to stop most forms of internet crime
because of the private nature of the internet, thus eroding the formal control.
Felson and Clarke claim that there is a need to address the specific
situation of crime. This means to focus not on why offenders commit crimes, but
on what situations allow offenders to commit those crimes. What then, are the
situations where internet crime takes place? While this study did not cover the
situations where these crimes take place there can be inferences drawn from the
results of what hackers recommend. For instance, the most recommended
strategy was to keep your software updated. This reveals that many hackers are
breaking through outdated software.
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As shown through the findings of this research, much of the advice given
relies on users taking more precautions against shady practices. While the
advice given sounds as obvious as, locking our car doors at night or avoiding bad
parts of town; it is still a fact that millions of people could have avoided
victimization by simply not clicking on the link or downloading a file. It may be the
case that simple, routine precautions, such as knowing that if you click on those
links or download those files you will be infected with a computer virus that steals
your credit card information, are not in common use.
The next question to ask is, what then would need to be done to adopt
routine precautions against internet crime? Felson and Clarke (2010) speculate
that it would be easier to get organizations and governments involved with
getting people to adopt routine precautions then getting citizens themselves to
adopt them
It is easier to change the minds of a few thousand organizations than
to change the minds of 250 million individuals. By working with
organizations rather than individuals, it may be possible to bring
prevention to fruition more quickly while feeding back what is learned
into improved criminology. (pg. 118)

Policy Implications
Felson and Clarke conclude that governments will increasingly rely on
routine precautions to prevent crime. They state that there are multiple items that
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governments will need to consider: the range and prevalence of routine
precautions, the public and private resources, their inconvenience and
opportunity costs, their effectiveness and efficiency as crime prevention
measures, and their other benefits from feelings of empowerment and control.
Once governments are onboard with promoting routine precautions, then the
challenge becomes getting citizens to adopt these routine precautions. Felson
and Clark go on to posit five methods to convince citizens to adopt routine
precautions--formal social controls, informal supervision, signage and
instructions, product design to facilitate routine precautions, and finally design to
improve natural surveillance.
(1) Formal social controls are laws designed to protect citizens such as
curfews. When applied to internet crimes this would be mandating important
websites and software to force users to change their passwords to thwart people
from compromising their passwords.
(2) Informal supervision is when people keep an eye out for each other.
This could include family members watching for criminal activity. As well as,
reminding their friends and family to lock up and other tips to keep them safe.
This could be used on internet crimes by reminding family members to not go to
suspicious links and to update their computer software.
(3) Signage and instructions is when there are notes and signs posted
around a neighborhood or areas where people travel. For instance, the signs you
see reminding you to lock your car doors. Another example is the signs around
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Barcelona warning tourists about pick pockets. Applying this strategy to the
internet this would be like email services displaying messages not to download
attachments from unknown senders.
(4) Products designed to facilitate routine precautions would include
lockers with automated locks where users can choose their own password.
Another example would be cars that lock automatically a short while after the key
has been removed. An example of this in the internet world would be computers
that automatically update their software.
(5) Finally, are designs that improve natural surveillance. This would
include installing motion lights or making sure that dark areas around their house
are illuminated. In the internet this would be installing anti-virus on a computer or
a website that hosts files scanning the files before they are made public.
After seeing how these routine precautions can be applied to the public
one can then ask what precautions should be endorsed. Felson and Clarke
(2010) recommend that routine precautions are grouped into bundles that are
proven to work. This avoids overloading the population with precautions that do
not work or contradict each other. Examining the results of this study, there are
multiple strategies that can be bundled together. Seven strategies that can be
derived from the results to be routine precautions include: Do not click on
suspicious links, do not use public Wi-Fi/computers, install antivirus/antimalware,
use strong unique passwords, run scans on important files, check activity on
important data, and finally keep software updated.
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These strategies, if implemented by the public, could be instrumental in
combatting the wave of internet crime and personal data breeches. Although
these strategies did not come from examining citizens routine precautions, it is
important to note that that they did come from the hacking community. As
Jacques and Reynald (2012) stated there is a need to learn from offenders to
protect ourselves. Furthermore, Thycotic (2014) found that 88% of hackers
surveyed believe their information is at risk. Therefore, these precautions should
be considered as routine precautions. This is because if hackers are concerned
about their personal information being at risk, then everyone who accesses the
internet is at risk as well.
Limitations
While these strategies were recommended by the hacking community, as
stated before, there was no data to suggest how effective each strategy was in
preventing crime. Additionally, this project sought to capture more in scope. For
example, this project sought to capture the dates of technique recommended to
see if techniques changed over time, however data on this was not collected in
the data gathering process so that fell outside of the scope of this project. This
means there is no way to tell if the strategies recommended change over time.
Additionally, this project sought to gather exposure data and data from videos,
but there was not enough information on those categories to put into this project.
This could have given more information about the effectiveness of the strategies.
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Finally, when examining fan pages, the only website looked at was Reddit which
could have influenced these recommendations.
Future Research
Future studies should look at how effective these strategies are in
reducing crimes. As Felson and Clarke (2010) called for, bundles of routine
precautions should be examined for their effectiveness. Also, future researchers
should look at how feasible it is to educate the general population about these
strategies and to make these strategies routine precautions. Finally, future
research should look at different forms of hacker media and interview hackers to
come up with more accurate routine precaution bundles.

Difficulties in Applying Situational Crime Prevention
While situational crime prevention has had success in being applied to
offenders as victims of conventional street crime (Jacques & Reynald, 2012) and
to cybercrime generally (Hinduja & Kooi, 2013; Willison & Siponen, 2009), the
final theme emerging from the present study is that the SCP lens was not fully
realized when applied to cybertheft. For example, while Jacques and Reynald
(2012) found in their study of offenders use of SCP that their sample of drug
dealers used all the main categories of SCP, this study found that hackers did
not. There were no prevention strategies identified for any of the categories of
Remove Excuses. Even within the most represented category, Reduce the
Rewards, there are still specific techniques categories with no representation in
all of the 379 codings, i.e., identify property and disrupt markets had zero codings
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tied to those techniques. Another technique that was not represented within the
coding was the reduce anonymity technique in the category Increase Effort.
Finally, in the category of Reduce Provocation, I found no recommendations of
techniques to reduce frustration and stress and neutralize peer pressure.
Furthermore, research looking at applying SCP to the information security
sector had similar struggles of applying SCP. Looking back at research by
Willison and Siponen (2009), they sought ways to apply the 25 techniques of
SCP to information security. They produced a modified SCP chart that had
examples from the information security world. However, this chart did not have
any examples for the techniques Disrupt Markets, Avoid Disputes, Reduce
Emotional Arousal, Neutralize Peer Pressure, Post Instructions, Alert
Conscience, and finally Control Drugs and Alcohol. Willison and Siponen argued
that these techniques that did not have examples were areas to be looked at
further by practitioners. Yet, as this research shows, those areas might prove
difficult to fully explore with SCP. Other SCP research on information security
has had success in applying SCP to that area but with modifications to the
current table. Hinduja and Kooi (2013) managed to apply the techniques of SCP
to information security by using the original 16 techniques instead of the current
25. Hinduja and Kooi deemed the original iteration of SCP to be more
appropriate for information security because it has more generalizability than the
techniques used presently.
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Looking at these results from this study, the majority of categories and
techniques that did not show in the findings were those that rely on personal
interactions. One reason for this is because cybertheft does not rely on personal
interactions. For example, infecting someone’s computer with a virus to steal
their information could easily be done through an infected link sent out to random
people online. So, while there are multiple studies showing that SCP can prevent
street crime (Anderson & Pease, 1994; Challinger, 1996; Clarke, 1990;
Matthews, 1990), the present study suggests that SCP might not be fully
applicable to specific types of online crimes.
Limitations
This study does have important limitations that can contribute to these
results. Most importantly, the strategies recommended were classified under a
specific technique using a best fit protocol. What this means is that if a strategy
did not fit well under one of the five techniques it was placed into one that
seemed to be the best fit. Also, if a strategy could be classified as several
different techniques, I used my best judgement to classify it as one technique.
What this means is that some strategies were placed into their categories
subjectively therefore someone else might say that those strategies could be
placed into other techniques.
Future Studies
Future studies should first, come up with a guide on how to classify
strategies to techniques. This would allow researchers to avoid biases in coding,
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as well as, confusion when encountering unknown strategies that do not fit within
any technique or category. Moreover, future studies should examine only
categories of SCP as that would allow the classifying of strategies to be less
confusion about which strategies go to which techniques.

58

Conclusion
This project examined the protection methods suggested by hackers to
guard against online victimization through the lens of Situation Crime Prevention.
The data were collected from 85 webpages representing three categories of
electronic communications: forums, blogs, and fan pages. The goal of this project
was to identify which of the 25 opportunity reduction techniques the hacking
community recommend most often, as well as, what level of expertise is
associated with the suggested security measures. Results indicated that the
technique most recommended by the hacking community was remove targets
with 27% of the total codings. Results also showed that 90% of all advice given
could be used by those with little computer knowledge.
From the results three themes emerged: hacker opportunities, routine
precautions, and finally, the difficulties in applying SCP. It was found that the
hackers are not overly concerned with professional, highly-skilled attacks, rather
their advice would thwart recreational opportunists. The results also showed
support for Routine Precautions theory which states that we all take routine
precautions against crime every day. It is speculated that because the internet is
new, these routine precautions are not ingrained within the general population,
therefore cyber-oriented suppliers should be pressured into building routine
precautions into their products. Finally, it was found that SCP had limitations on
how it could be applied to stop cybertheft, in part because this class of crime
does not always require direct victim-offender interaction. This was shown in
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other research which also had difficulties in applying the techniques of SCP. This
study demonstrates that much can be learned that will advance cybercrime
prevention from the listening to the offenders themselves.
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